T1566.001: Spearphishing Attachment
| View on MITRE ATT&CK | T1566.001 |
|---|---|
| Tactic(s) | Initial Access |
| Associated CAPEC Patterns | Spear Phishing (CAPEC-163) |
Data from MITRE ATT&CK®:
Adversaries may send spearphishing emails with a malicious attachment in an attempt to gain access to victim systems. Spearphishing attachment is a specific variant of spearphishing. Spearphishing attachment is different from other forms of spearphishing in that it employs the use of malware attached to an email. All forms of spearphishing are electronically delivered social engineering targeted at a specific individual, company, or industry. In this scenario, adversaries attach a file to the spearphishing email and usually rely upon User Execution to gain execution. Spearphishing may also involve social engineering techniques, such as posing as a trusted source.
There are many options for the attachment such as Microsoft Office documents, executables, PDFs, or archived files. Upon opening the attachment (and potentially clicking past protections), the adversary's payload exploits a vulnerability or directly executes on the user's system. The text of the spearphishing email usually tries to give a plausible reason why the file should be opened, and may explain how to bypass system protections in order to do so. The email may also contain instructions on how to decrypt an attachment, such as a zip file password, in order to evade email boundary defenses. Adversaries frequently manipulate file extensions and icons in order to make attached executables appear to be document files, or files exploiting one application appear to be a file for a different one.
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Cyber Threat Graph Context
Explore how this ATT&CK Technique relates to the wider threat graph
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Mitigations for this technique
MITRE ATT&CK Mitigations
Restrict Web-Based Content
Restrict use of certain websites, block downloads/attachments, block Javascript, restrict browser extensions, etc.Network Intrusion Prevention
Use intrusion detection signatures to block traffic at network boundaries.Software Configuration
Implement configuration changes to software (other than the operating system) to mitigate security risks associated to how the software operates.Antivirus/Antimalware
Use signatures or heuristics to detect malicious software.User Training
Train users to be aware of access or manipulation attempts by an adversary to reduce the risk of successful spearphishing, social engineering, and other techniques that involve user interaction.How to detect this technique
MITRE ATT&CK Data Components
Application Log Content (Application Log)
Logging, messaging, and other artifacts provided by third-party services (ex: metrics, errors, and/or alerts from mail/web applications)Network Traffic Flow (Network Traffic)
Summarized network packet data, with metrics, such as protocol headers and volume (ex: Netflow or Zeek http.log)Network Traffic Content (Network Traffic)
Logged network traffic data showing both protocol header and body values (ex: PCAP)File Creation (File)
Initial construction of a new file (ex: Sysmon EID 11)Control Validation Tests for this Technique
Use Atomic Red Team tests to test your defenses against this technique.
Sigma Detections for this Technique
Office Macro File Creation
Office Macro File Download
Suspicious HWP Sub Processes
ISO or Image Mount Indicator in Recent Files
Suspicious Execution From Outlook Temporary Folder
Suspicious HH.EXE Execution
Office Macro File Creation From Suspicious Process
ISO Image Mounted
Suspicious Double Extension File Execution
Windows Registry Trust Record Modification
Suspicious Microsoft OneNote Child Process
Password Protected ZIP File Opened (Email Attachment)
Arbitrary Shell Command Execution Via Settingcontent-Ms
Potential Initial Access via DLL Search Order Hijacking
ISO File Created Within Temp Folders
HTML Help HH.EXE Suspicious Child Process
SP800-53 Controls
See which controls can help protect against this MITRE ATT&CK technique. This is based on mappings to associated SP800-53 controls produced by the MITRE Engenuity Center for Threat-Informed Defense.