T1557: Adversary-in-the-Middle
| View on MITRE ATT&CK | T1557 |
|---|---|
| Tactic(s) | Credential Access, Collection |
| Associated CAPEC Patterns | Adversary in the Middle (AiTM) (CAPEC-94) |
Data from MITRE ATT&CK®:
Adversaries may attempt to position themselves between two or more networked devices using an adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) technique to support follow-on behaviors such as Network Sniffing, Transmitted Data Manipulation, or replay attacks (Exploitation for Credential Access). By abusing features of common networking protocols that can determine the flow of network traffic (e.g. ARP, DNS, LLMNR, etc.), adversaries may force a device to communicate through an adversary controlled system so they can collect information or perform additional actions.(Citation: Rapid7 MiTM Basics)
For example, adversaries may manipulate victim DNS settings to enable other malicious activities such as preventing/redirecting users from accessing legitimate sites and/or pushing additional malware.(Citation: ttint_rat)(Citation: dns_changer_trojans)(Citation: ad_blocker_with_miner) Adversaries may also manipulate DNS and leverage their position in order to intercept user credentials and session cookies.(Citation: volexity_0day_sophos_FW) Downgrade Attacks can also be used to establish an AiTM position, such as by negotiating a less secure, deprecated, or weaker version of communication protocol (SSL/TLS) or encryption algorithm.(Citation: mitm_tls_downgrade_att)(Citation: taxonomy_downgrade_att_tls)(Citation: tlseminar_downgrade_att)
Adversaries may also leverage the AiTM position to attempt to monitor and/or modify traffic, such as in Transmitted Data Manipulation. Adversaries can setup a position similar to AiTM to prevent traffic from flowing to the appropriate destination, potentially to Impair Defenses and/or in support of a Network Denial of Service.
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Cyber Threat Graph Context
Explore how this ATT&CK Technique relates to the wider threat graph
Reporting on this Technique
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Mitigations for this technique
MITRE ATT&CK Mitigations
Filter Network Traffic
Use network appliances to filter ingress or egress traffic and perform protocol-based filtering. Configure software on endpoints to filter network traffic.User Training
Train users to be aware of access or manipulation attempts by an adversary to reduce the risk of successful spearphishing, social engineering, and other techniques that involve user interaction.Disable or Remove Feature or Program
Remove or deny access to unnecessary and potentially vulnerable software to prevent abuse by adversaries.Encrypt Sensitive Information
Protect sensitive information with strong encryption.Limit Access to Resource Over Network
Prevent access to file shares, remote access to systems, unnecessary services. Mechanisms to limit access may include use of network concentrators, RDP gateways, etc.Network Segmentation
Architect sections of the network to isolate critical systems, functions, or resources. Use physical and logical segmentation to prevent access to potentially sensitive systems and information. Use a DMZ to contain any internet-facing services...Network Intrusion Prevention
Use intrusion detection signatures to block traffic at network boundaries.How to detect this technique
MITRE ATT&CK Data Components
Windows Registry Key Modification (Windows Registry)
Changes made to a Registry Key and/or Key value (ex: Windows EID 4657 or Sysmon EID 13|14)Application Log Content (Application Log)
Logging, messaging, and other artifacts provided by third-party services (ex: metrics, errors, and/or alerts from mail/web applications)Service Creation (Service)
Initial construction of a new service/daemon (ex: Windows EID 4697 or /var/log daemon logs)Network Traffic Flow (Network Traffic)
Summarized network packet data, with metrics, such as protocol headers and volume (ex: Netflow or Zeek http.log)Network Traffic Content (Network Traffic)
Logged network traffic data showing both protocol header and body values (ex: PCAP)Sigma Detections for this Technique
SP800-53 Controls
See which controls can help protect against this MITRE ATT&CK technique. This is based on mappings to associated SP800-53 controls produced by the MITRE Engenuity Center for Threat-Informed Defense.