T1558.003: Kerberoasting
| View on MITRE ATT&CK | T1558.003 |
|---|---|
| Tactic(s) | Credential Access |
| Associated CAPEC Patterns | Kerberoasting (CAPEC-509) |
Data from MITRE ATT&CK®:
Adversaries may abuse a valid Kerberos ticket-granting ticket (TGT) or sniff network traffic to obtain a ticket-granting service (TGS) ticket that may be vulnerable to Brute Force.(Citation: Empire InvokeKerberoast Oct 2016)(Citation: AdSecurity Cracking Kerberos Dec 2015)
Service principal names (SPNs) are used to uniquely identify each instance of a Windows service. To enable authentication, Kerberos requires that SPNs be associated with at least one service logon account (an account specifically tasked with running a service(Citation: Microsoft Detecting Kerberoasting Feb 2018)).(Citation: Microsoft SPN)(Citation: Microsoft SetSPN)(Citation: SANS Attacking Kerberos Nov 2014)(Citation: Harmj0y Kerberoast Nov 2016)
Adversaries possessing a valid Kerberos ticket-granting ticket (TGT) may request one or more Kerberos ticket-granting service (TGS) service tickets for any SPN from a domain controller (DC).(Citation: Empire InvokeKerberoast Oct 2016)(Citation: AdSecurity Cracking Kerberos Dec 2015) Portions of these tickets may be encrypted with the RC4 algorithm, meaning the Kerberos 5 TGS-REP etype 23 hash of the service account associated with the SPN is used as the private key and is thus vulnerable to offline Brute Force attacks that may expose plaintext credentials.(Citation: AdSecurity Cracking Kerberos Dec 2015)(Citation: Empire InvokeKerberoast Oct 2016) (Citation: Harmj0y Kerberoast Nov 2016)
This same behavior could be executed using service tickets captured from network traffic.(Citation: AdSecurity Cracking Kerberos Dec 2015)
Cracked hashes may enable Persistence, Privilege Escalation, and Lateral Movement via access to Valid Accounts.(Citation: SANS Attacking Kerberos Nov 2014)
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Cyber Threat Graph Context
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Reporting on this Technique
APT40 Advisory - PRC MSS tradecraft in action
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Mitigations for this technique
MITRE ATT&CK Mitigations
Encrypt Sensitive Information
Protect sensitive information with strong encryption.Password Policies
Set and enforce secure password policies for accounts.Privileged Account Management
Manage the creation, modification, use, and permissions associated to privileged accounts, including SYSTEM and root.How to detect this technique
MITRE ATT&CK Data Components
Control Validation Tests for this Technique
Use Atomic Red Team tests to test your defenses against this technique.
Sigma Detections for this Technique
Suspicious Kerberos RC4 Ticket Encryption
No Suitable Encryption Key Found For Generating Kerberos Ticket
HackTool - KrbRelayUp Execution
HackTool - Rubeus Execution - ScriptBlock
User Couldn't Call a Privileged Service 'LsaRegisterLogonProcess'
Kerberos Network Traffic RC4 Ticket Encryption
HackTool - KrbRelay Execution
Request A Single Ticket via PowerShell
Potential SPN Enumeration Via Setspn.EXE
Uncommon Outbound Kerberos Connection - Security
Register new Logon Process by Rubeus
Potential CVE-2021-42287 Exploitation Attempt
HackTool - Rubeus Execution
SP800-53 Controls
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