T1090.003: Multi-hop Proxy
| View on MITRE ATT&CK | T1090.003 |
|---|---|
| Tactic(s) | Command and Control |
Data from MITRE ATT&CK®:
To disguise the source of malicious traffic, adversaries may chain together multiple proxies. Typically, a defender will be able to identify the last proxy traffic traversed before it enters their network; the defender may or may not be able to identify any previous proxies before the last-hop proxy. This technique makes identifying the original source of the malicious traffic even more difficult by requiring the defender to trace malicious traffic through several proxies to identify its source. A particular variant of this behavior is to use onion routing networks, such as the publicly available TOR network. (Citation: Onion Routing)
In the case of network infrastructure, particularly routers, it is possible for an adversary to leverage multiple compromised devices to create a multi-hop proxy chain within the Wide-Area Network (WAN) of the enterprise. By leveraging Patch System Image, adversaries can add custom code to the affected network devices that will implement onion routing between those nodes. This custom onion routing network will transport the encrypted C2 traffic through the compromised population, allowing adversaries to communicate with any device within the onion routing network. This method is dependent upon the Network Boundary Bridging method in order to allow the adversaries to cross the protected network boundary of the Internet perimeter and into the organization’s WAN. Protocols such as ICMP may be used as a transport.
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Cyber Threat Graph Context
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Reporting on this Technique
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Mitigations for this technique
MITRE ATT&CK Mitigations
How to detect this technique
MITRE ATT&CK Data Components
Network Traffic Content (Network Traffic)
Logged network traffic data showing both protocol header and body values (ex: PCAP)Network Traffic Flow (Network Traffic)
Summarized network packet data, with metrics, such as protocol headers and volume (ex: Netflow or Zeek http.log)Network Connection Creation (Network Traffic)
Initial construction of a network connection, such as capturing socket information with a source/destination IP and port(s) (ex: Windows EID 5156, Sysmon EID 3, or Zeek conn.log)Control Validation Tests for this Technique
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Sigma Detections for this Technique
SP800-53 Controls
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