T1562.006: Indicator Blocking
View on MITRE ATT&CK | T1562.006 |
---|---|
Tactic(s) | Defense Evasion |
Associated CAPEC Patterns | Block Logging to Central Repository (CAPEC-571) |
Data from MITRE ATT&CK®:
An adversary may attempt to block indicators or events typically captured by sensors from being gathered and analyzed. This could include maliciously redirecting(Citation: Microsoft Lamin Sept 2017) or even disabling host-based sensors, such as Event Tracing for Windows (ETW)(Citation: Microsoft About Event Tracing 2018), by tampering settings that control the collection and flow of event telemetry.(Citation: Medium Event Tracing Tampering 2018) These settings may be stored on the system in configuration files and/or in the Registry as well as being accessible via administrative utilities such as PowerShell or Windows Management Instrumentation.
For example, adversaries may modify the File
value in HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\EventLog\Security
to hide their malicious actions in a new or different .evtx log file. This action does not require a system reboot and takes effect immediately.(Citation: disable_win_evt_logging)
ETW interruption can be achieved multiple ways, however most directly by defining conditions using the PowerShell Set-EtwTraceProvider
cmdlet or by interfacing directly with the Registry to make alterations.
In the case of network-based reporting of indicators, an adversary may block traffic associated with reporting to prevent central analysis. This may be accomplished by many means, such as stopping a local process responsible for forwarding telemetry and/or creating a host-based firewall rule to block traffic to specific hosts responsible for aggregating events, such as security information and event management (SIEM) products.
In Linux environments, adversaries may disable or reconfigure log processing tools such as syslog or nxlog to inhibit detection and monitoring capabilities to facilitate follow on behaviors (Citation: LemonDuck).
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Cyber Threat Graph Context
Explore how this ATT&CK Technique relates to the wider threat graph
Mitigations for this technique
MITRE ATT&CK Mitigations
Software Configuration
Implement configuration changes to software (other than the operating system) to mitigate security risks associated to how the software operates.Restrict File and Directory Permissions
Restrict access by setting directory and file permissions that are not specific to users or privileged accounts.User Account Management
Manage the creation, modification, use, and permissions associated to user accounts.How to detect this technique
MITRE ATT&CK Data Components
Windows Registry Key Modification (Windows Registry)
Changes made to a Registry Key and/or Key value (ex: Windows EID 4657 or Sysmon EID 13|14)Host Status (Sensor Health)
Logging, messaging, and other artifacts highlighting the health of host sensors (ex: metrics, errors, and/or exceptions from logging applications)Command Execution (Command)
The execution of a line of text, potentially with arguments, created from program code (e.g. a cmdlet executed via powershell.exe, interactive commands like >dir, shell executions, etc. )Control Validation Tests for this Technique
Use Atomic Red Team tests to test your defenses against this technique.
Auditing Configuration Changes on Linux Host
Disable .NET Event Tracing for Windows Via Registry (powershell)
LockBit Black - Disable the ETW Provider of Windows Defender -cmd
LockBit Black - Disable the ETW Provider of Windows Defender -Powershell
Disable Powershell ETW Provider - Windows
Logging Configuration Changes on Linux Host
Disable .NET Event Tracing for Windows Via Registry (cmd)
Logging Configuration Changes on FreeBSD Host
Auditing Configuration Changes on FreeBSD Host
Sigma Detections for this Technique
SP800-53 Controls
See which controls can help protect against this MITRE ATT&CK technique. This is based on mappings to associated SP800-53 controls produced by the MITRE Engenuity Center for Threat-Informed Defense.