T1543.004: Launch Daemon
| View on MITRE ATT&CK | T1543.004 |
|---|---|
| Tactic(s) | Privilege Escalation, Persistence |
| Associated CAPEC Patterns | Run Software at Logon (CAPEC-564) |
Data from MITRE ATT&CK®:
Adversaries may create or modify Launch Daemons to execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. Launch Daemons are plist files used to interact with Launchd, the service management framework used by macOS. Launch Daemons require elevated privileges to install, are executed for every user on a system prior to login, and run in the background without the need for user interaction. During the macOS initialization startup, the launchd process loads the parameters for launch-on-demand system-level daemons from plist files found in /System/Library/LaunchDaemons/ and /Library/LaunchDaemons/. Required Launch Daemons parameters include a Label to identify the task, Program to provide a path to the executable, and RunAtLoad to specify when the task is run. Launch Daemons are often used to provide access to shared resources, updates to software, or conduct automation tasks.(Citation: AppleDocs Launch Agent Daemons)(Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence)(Citation: launchd Keywords for plists)
Adversaries may install a Launch Daemon configured to execute at startup by using the RunAtLoad parameter set to true and the Program parameter set to the malicious executable path. The daemon name may be disguised by using a name from a related operating system or benign software (i.e. Masquerading). When the Launch Daemon is executed, the program inherits administrative permissions.(Citation: WireLurker)(Citation: OSX Malware Detection)
Additionally, system configuration changes (such as the installation of third party package managing software) may cause folders such as usr/local/bin to become globally writeable. So, it is possible for poor configurations to allow an adversary to modify executables referenced by current Launch Daemon's plist files.(Citation: LaunchDaemon Hijacking)(Citation: sentinelone macos persist Jun 2019)
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Mitigations for this technique
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MITRE ATT&CK Data Components
Command Execution (Command)
The execution of a line of text, potentially with arguments, created from program code (e.g. a cmdlet executed via powershell.exe, interactive commands like >dir, shell executions, etc. )File Creation (File)
Initial construction of a new file (ex: Sysmon EID 11)Service Modification (Service)
Changes made to a service/daemon, such as changes to name, description, and/or start type (ex: Windows EID 7040 or /var/log daemon logs)File Modification (File)
Changes made to a file, or its access permissions and attributes, typically to alter the contents of the targeted file (ex: Windows EID 4670 or Sysmon EID 2)Service Creation (Service)
Initial construction of a new service/daemon (ex: Windows EID 4697 or /var/log daemon logs)Process Creation (Process)
The initial construction of an executable managed by the OS, that may involve one or more tasks or threads. (e.g. Win EID 4688, Sysmon EID 1, cmd.exe > net use, etc.)Control Validation Tests for this Technique
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Sigma Detections for this Technique
SP800-53 Controls
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